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Rights in property-particularly in land-have been described as the foundation of every
other right of persons in a free society: "To the framers [of the US Constitution]
identifying property with freedom meant that if you could own property, you were free.
Ownership of property was protected. 3
Particularly critical in many jurisdictions is the right to exclude others. In 1936, the
American Law Institute's Restatement of the Law of Property described the possessory
interest in land in terms of the right to exclude, as follows-
"A possessory interest in land exists in a person who has (a) a physical relation to the
land of a kind which gives a certain degree of physical control over then land, and an
intent so to exercise such control as to exclude other members of society in general
from any present occupation of the land." 4
One noted commentator has described the "notion of exclusive possession" as "implicit
in the basic conception of private property" .'
Chief Justice Rehnquist of the U.S. Supreme Court is particularly vocal, having described
the owner's right to exclude others from private land as, "universally held to be a
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fundamental element of the property right ... even if the Government physically invades
only an easement in property, it must nonetheless pay compensation" ' 6, and "one of the
most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterised as
property". 7 That Court later descried physical intrusion as "the most serious form of
invasion of an owner's property interests. [T]he government does not take a single
'strand' of the bundle of property rights: it chips through the bundle, taking a slice of
every strand".' The Court's explanation for this, was expressed as follows-
"Moreover, an owner suffers a special kind of injury when a stranger directly invades
and occupies the owner's property. As [another part of the Opinion] indicates,
property law has long protected an owner's expectation that [he] will be relatively
undisturbed at least in the possession of [his] property. To require, as well, that the
owner permit another to exercise compete dominion literally adds insult to injury.
Futhermore, such occupation is qualitatively more severe than a regulation of the use
of the property, even a regulation that imposes affirmative duties on the owner, since
the owner may have no control over the timing, extent, or nature of the invasion" .9
This right to exclude achieved international status with the 1999 Opinion of the European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Chassagnou and Others v France. 10 Before the Court
was the French Loi Verdeille", which provides for the statutory pooling of hunting
grounds. The effects on the claimants-three farmers-was to force them to become
members of a municipal hunters' association (ACCA) and to transfer hunting rights to the
association, with the result that all association members could enter their property for the
purpose of hunting. 2 The three farmers belong to two anti-hunting wildlife protection
associations and strenuously objected to hunters on their property against their express
wishes as landowners. In particular, they alleged violation of Articles 9, 11 and 14 of the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(ECHR), together with Article 1 of its Protocol No 1, which states that:
"Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of [his]
possessions. No one shall be deprived of [his] possessions except in the public
interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general
principles of international law".
The Court framed the issues as follows:
"The applicants submit that the obligation for them to transfer hunting rights over
their land to ACCA, against their will and without compensation or consideration,
constituted an abnormal deprivation of their right to use their property, firstly in that
they were obliged to tolerate the presence of hunters on their land, whereas they were
opposed to hunting for ethical reasons, and secondly in that they could not use the
land they owned for the creation of nature reserves where hunting was prohibited."13
6 Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-180 (1979).
7 ibid., see also Rehnquist's Opinion in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994).
Loretto v Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corporation, 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982).
ibid., at 436.
10 see fn.2.
1 Law No. 64-696 of July 10, 1964.
12 ibid., at para. 13.
13 ibid., at para. 72.
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The government of France responded that the interference with the applicants' property
rights was minor because they had not been deprived of the right to use their property
and all they lost was the right to prevent other people from hunting on their land.
The Court disagreed. It began by noting that Article 1 of the Protocol, quoted above,
requires that any interference with individual property rights would further require a fair
balance between the demands of the general community and the protection of individual
fundamental rights. 4 The Court also found that it was "undoubtedly in the general
interest to avoid unregulated hunting and encourage the traditional management of
game stocks" 15-clearly the purpose of Loi Verdeille. However, the Court found the
interference with the applicants' fundamental right to peaceful enjoyment of their land
"disproportionate", and expressed that opinion as follows:
"[N]otwithstanding the legitimate aims of Loi Verdeille when it was adopted, the
Court considers that the result of the compulsory transfer system which it lays down
has been to place the applicants in a situation which upsets the fair balance to be
struck between protection of the right to property and the requirements of the
general interest. Compelling small landowners to transfer hunting rights over their
land so that others can make use of them in a way which is totally incompatible with
their beliefs imposes a disproportionate burden which is not justified under the
second paragraph of Article 1 of the Protocol. There has therefore been a violation
of that provision". 1 6
The Court also found discrimination on the ground of property within the meaning of
Article 14 of the Convention, because only small landowners were required to transfer
their hunting rights under the Loi Verdeille. 17 In coming to the conclusion that there was
also a violation of Article 11 of the ECHR, the Court said:
"To compel a person by law to join an association such that it is fundamentally
contrary to [his] owners' convictions to be a member of it, and to oblige him, on
account of his membership of that association, to transfer [his] rights over the land
[he] owns so that the association in question can attain objectives of which [he]
disapproves, goes beyond what is necessary to ensure that a fair balance is struck
between conflicting interests and cannot be considered proportionate to the aim
pursued." 8
The holding and reasoning of the Chassagnou case should be compulsory reading in
jurisdictions where the right to exclude is under pressure-if not outright attack. Thus, for
example, courts in the U.S. State of Oregon pretend to find a "custom" for the entire
population of the State to go upon dry sand beach areas anywhere in the State , citing
the eighteenth-century English lawyer, William Blackstone as authority.19 Of course
Blackstone in his Commentaries would have absolutely rejected such a perversion of
custom for woeful lack of certainty-whether of the custom (too general), the place (far
14 Law No. 64-696 at July 10,1964.
15 ibid., para. 79.
16 ibid., para. 85.
17 ibid., para. 92-95.
i s ibid., para. 117.
19 State of Oregon ex rel Thornton v. Hay 462 P 2d 671 (Ore 1969).
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too large geographically), or the persons entitled to exercise it (far to large a class).2"
Custom cannot possibly serve to derogate from the common law property right to
exclude in such circumstances. One contemporary (with Blackstone) judge observed-
"How that which may be claimed by all the inhabitants if England can be the subject
of a custom, I cannot conceive. Customs must in their nature be confined to
individuals of a particular description, and what is common to all mankind, can never
be a custom."'"
Likewise in the U.S. State of Hawaii, the State's highest court has granted native
Hawaiians the right to go upon any "not fully developed" land in the State for the
purposes of exercising constitutionally-protected traditional and cultural rights, without
defining either such rights or what constitutes a native Hawaiian.22
To the landowners' complaints that such a holding would fundamentally alter its property
rights-in particular the right to exclude others, the court blithely observed that such
arguments "place undue reliance on Western understanding of property law that are not
universally applicable in Hawaii."
Such jurisdictions could usefully be reminded of the universal nature of property rights
and the fundamental nature of the right to excluded, as ably set forth by the ECHR in
Chassagnou, that-
"[An interference with property rights and the right to exclude must achieve a 'fair
balance' between the demands of the general interest of the community and the
requirements of the protection of the individual's fundamental rights. 2 4
20 Blackstone, Commentaries ion the Laws of England 1765-1769, at 78; cf. Also David L. Callies, Custom
and Public Trust: Background Principles of State Property Law? (2000) 30 E.L.R. 10003.
21 Fitch v Rawling (1795) [1775-1892] All E.R. 571, at 574.
22 Over 200,000 people in the State-one-fifth of its population-claim some Hawaiian blood: PASH v.
Hawaii County Planning Commission 903 p. 2D 1246 (Hawaii 1995); Hawaii v. Hanapi 970 P. 2d 485
(Hawaii 1998). See, Sullivan, Traditional and Customary Revolutions: The Law of Custom and the Conflict
of Traditions in Hawaii, 20 Haw. L. Rev. 99 (1999).
23 PASH, ibid.
24 Chassagnou, see fn.2, at para. 75.
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